Taliban are coming?

When the Kashmir society doesn’t identify itself with violence India better invest in peace building rather than glorifying Taliban
Riyaz Masroor
“We’re here for your safety but that is not enough. It’s you who will ensure complete safety. You will have to be vigilant and behave as good citizens. We know you hate violence and love peace but when a militant comes to you, counsel him. You can persuade him for surrender. Violence destructs, peace promises prosperity.”
This is just to recall those ‘nostalgic’ sermons an army commander or a CO of BSF/ CRPF would give at the end of every crackdown during early days of militancy in Kashmir. We’ve also witnessed the armed forces – which would be expected to handle the insurgency through military means alone – lapsing into the domain of public administration; a whole gamut of military administration came up in the form of Operation Sadhbhawana. Under the aegis of this operation, we saw schools, computer centers and orphanages being set up, mini-power projects, sports and cultural festivals being commissioned, student-trips across India (Bharat Darshan) being sponsored and rousing reception being given to Hajj Pilgrims on their return from the Holy city of Jeddah.
On the face of it, the motive behind the operation looked positive: to make the violence in Kashmir unpopular. Pundits of peace and conflict studies may agree with the fact that India in Kashmir never faced the crisis of control; it was trying to tackle the crisis of public alienation from the political mainstream, precisely the legitimacy. The main characteristic of Kashmir militancy was the social acceptance of violence against India and it was this social sanctity attached to the gun-wielding militant that was troubling Indian policy makers hence the attempt at “winning hearts and minds”. So much emphasis was given to stigmatize the violence that we saw a whole host of writers, newspapers, institutions , academics, separatists and semi-separatists promoting the idea that Kashmiris cannot afford violence for too long and they should stop counting on violence vis-à-vis their aspirations for Azadi.
Almost a decade went without any substantial impact and we even heard the most reasonable voices, including that of Late Abdul Gani Lone, welcoming the “Mujahideen” who had occupied the mountain peaks of Kargil in the summer of 1999. But at long last the Operation Sadhbhawana worked, though major part of the credit must go to nine-eleven. Thereafter we saw the separatist discourse in Kashmir performing a headlong. Hurriyat Conference, which by then would be seen as the over-ground face of militancy, would now advocate peaceful negotiated settlement, oppose innocent killings and ask militants to hold fire against Indian troops. The killing of top militant leaders would doubtless attract large funerals but the absence of support for a violence-driven resistance was conspicuous.
If there were any doubts that the violence was still popular, they were cleared in the summer of 2008 when around five million people marched during half-a-dozen Azadi rallies and militants preferred to retreat on the fringe, their guns downed. Not just this. Having seen at least sixty people dead during ruthless Police and Army actions, people lined up outside polling stations and voted in throes, ignoring the boycott calls from APHC while wearing the Azadi sentiment manifestly on their sleeves. Interestingly, all this happened when India and Pakistan were on the brink of a war following a terrorist strike in Mumbai on 26 November 2008. Indeed the collective peace overture from Kashmir showed that the purpose for which Operation Sadhbhawana was launched had been served to the fullest; not just separatist groups but people in larger numbers demonstrated their mutual aversion to violence and willingness to adopt democratic means of expression.
The violence lately became so unpopular that some sections even opposed the stone-throwing youth and wanted to devise even more “civilized form of resistance” let alone the option of gun. These impressions betray a loud urge for peace within Kashmir society. If the militancy in 1989 heralded an armed uprising it was because of a mass support. Would Taliban be so naïve to enter Kashmir at the height of popular distaste for violence?
Taliban are coming?
In such a fertile scenario for peace building in Kashmir, how should New Delhi proceed if there is really a Taliban threat? The answer is simple, it should consolidate the change of “hearts and minds” that has occurred post 9/11. Or to be precise, it should invest in people rather than Taliban. By glorifying the Taliban the country’s over-patriotic media is actually creating problems for the country. Neutral observers must be wondering why the authorities are scaring people of a specter, which is even abhorred by Syed Ali Geelani, whom the media portrays as the militant face of Kashmiri separatism, and also the sitting MP and PDP Chief Mahbooba Mufti. Both have questioned the government claims of spurt in militancy activities.
There is no formal word yet from home ministry or defense ministry. Director General of J&K Police Kuldeep Khudda has just pointed to the “possibility” of a Taliban spillover in Kashmir by arguing that after capturing Swat, Taliban have now reached to Lahore and “may be” interested in Pakistan’s Eastern borders. TV channels picked this up and made mountain out of a molehill. Even if the presumptuous TV disclosures about Taliban presence in Kashmir hold any salt, the standard way of dealing with it is not glorifying the intruder but building your fort. That is reinforcing the social stigma attached to violence.
Saner response from New Delhi should have been somewhat like this: “Taliban have no constituency in Kashmir. People have voted in larger numbers and rejected violence. People don’t want them here.” But it is a strange irony that the state and the society in Kashmir seem to have undergone a role reversal. While the state-backed media appears hell-bent to hammer the fact that Taliban are coming, the society is crying hoarse denying the possibility. Imagine if Taliban really come here, will they remain content with Kashmir alone? India better invest in peace building rather than glorifying Taliban.


Write back at : riyaz.masroor@yahoo.com