The K in Sri Lanka

Riyaz Masroor
Before the armed uprising in Kashmir, many of the Srinagar homes used to hang on their modest walls the portraits of M A Jinnah, S M Abdullah, Yasir Arafat and Imam Khomeini. People would identify themselves with the rebels of the time because the state in Srinagar was never organically wedded to the people. After the militancy broke out in 1989 the youth initially tended to deify Osama bin Laden but his portrait was never the part of Valley’s mainstream home décor; if the militant defiance against the “American Empire” was to be displayed Hassan Nasrullah of Lebanon was the preferred choice.
These choices signify the inherently pacifist behavior of Kashmiris. They liked Jinnah for his liberal outlook and pluralistic ideals; they adored Yasir Arafat for his pragmatism; they revered Khomeini not because he confronted USA but for his model of nationalism that was non-racist – Khomeini’s La Sharaqiyah, La Garabiyah slogan was a bold attempt to undo the menace of East-West divide. Why people followed Sheikh Abdullah? Borrowing Shamim Ahmad Shamim’s observation would be apt: “We owe to Sheikh Abdullah both our sunrise as well as our sunset.”
Any anthropological study of Kashmiri behavior would conclude that Kashmiris might be acutely conscious of their cultural identity but they are not the type of Al-Qaida or Taliban. The 20-year separatist campaign that has been marked by a decade of active insurgency also points to how the popular aversion to violence and bloodbath facilitated the transition from violent to the nonviolent mode of resistance. JKLF Chief Muhammad Yasin Malik chose to leave the path of violence in 1994 – barely four years after the militant uprising. His decision did not evoke a large-scale welcome but his shift was silently endorsed by the majority. Many used to argue that India coaxed Pakistan into a proxy military confrontation in Kashmir so that the nationalist resolve of Kashmiris could be crushed. It was, however, not because of these tales that the Kashmiri started rethinking over the means of his struggle but because the violence as a means of social resistance was genetically unpalatable for Kashmiri people. Unlike Arabs Kashmiris don’t slaughter the sacrificial lamb of their own; they hire the services of a professional butcher.
Then why Kashmiris resorted to gun in 1989? The almost worn out answer to this question is that for forty two years they had exhausted all democratic options including the participation in polls. But that is half of the actual answer. Untold part of this answer is that India through military means and political subterfuge had created enough reason for Pakistan to meddle militarily in Kashmiri region, which has never attained complete political cohesion with Indian mainstream. Now that the insurgencies are waning in South Asia – from Swat to Sri Lanka – the Srinagar is calling for serious attention from New Delhi.
Cold war has taught us that armed separatist movements that espouse the cause of religion, ethnicity or communism in Asia have spared big powers the hazard of direct wars; they fought proxy wars against each other in Vietnam, Afghanistan and now in Pakistan.
As for India it grew in size and status for past decade just because its neighborhood was mired in these insurgencies. When smaller powers falling in the neighborhood of a bigger power, remain restive the bigger power has the natural space for maneuvering. We saw Nepal, Sri Lanka and Pakistan in the history’s worst phase during past twenty years. But now we see Nepal being ruled by Maoist rebels who are sympathetic to their ideological cousins active within India; we see Pakistan army chasing away Taliban and we see LTTE, India’s longtime ‘strategic asset’, having been routed from the island nation, mainly with the help of China and Pakistan.
China’s presence in Sri Lanka is perceived as the beginning of India’s encirclement on the Indian Ocean. China has already set up Hambanthota port in Lanka and is now eyeing on Trincomalee port. Russia too has of late grown ambitious about Sri Lanka’s strategic sea-lanes. China is reported to have invested $1 billion in Sri Lanka for a naval base, and has supported the Lankan Army in its war against the Tamil tigers.
Having China, the country that won the 1962 war, on its southern shore, India has reason to be worried. The Tigers, if victorious against Sri Lanka state, would have supported India in her foreign policy ambitions, are down and out. In such a scenario the fear that China may attack India from South does not seem out of place. After all Tamil Nadu is still pro LTTE and the politics in South India has the same texture. In the event of any future war between China and India, or Pakistan and India, which way Sri Lanka will go, is anybody’s guess.
A Times of India blogpost on 20 May 2008 by a Bangalore reader said, “Chinese have port facilities around India: Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Chittagong (Bangla Desh) and Karachi (Pakistan). We are being hemmed in nicely.” But India has a nice option to avert any future war: Kashmir. And the bottom line is that no reason be left in Kashmir that would facilitate China’s overt or covert intrusion. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah is right. Kashmir solution is the key to permanent peace in India. Let the decision makers in Delhi remember that when Pakistan meddled in Kashmir in 1989 its growth rate was barely three percent and the USSR was intact; now Pakistan economy is being padded up by US coffers and the China is spreading influence in all fours. Let’s not leave a fertile ground for another proxy war.

riyaz.masroor@yahoo.com